For the second half of January in 2003, the seven women and men of shuttle Columbia’s STS-107 crew—Commander Rick Husband, Pilot Willie McCool, Mission Specialists Dave Brown, Mike Anderson, Laurel Clark and Kalpana “Okay.C.” Chawla, plus Payload Specialist Ilan Ramon of Israel—labored around-the-clock on 80 scientific experiments spanning quite a lot of disciplines from life sciences to fluid physics and from supplies processing to Earth observations. Eighty-seven missions after the calamitous lack of Challenger, shuttles had serviced the Hubble Area Telescope (HST), docked 9 instances with Russia’s Mir orbital advanced and begun constructing the Worldwide Area Station (ISS).
The shuttle, after all, remained an inherently harmful machine. However the robustness of the 4 surviving orbiters—Discovery, Endeavour, Columbia herself and Atlantis—had been amply demonstrated, repeatedly, and their shortfalls have been effectively understood. Or so it appeared. For these shortfalls got here residence to roost with horrifying suddenness twenty years in the past, on the morning of Saturday, 1 February 2003.
Throughout greater than twenty years of operational service, the shuttle fleet weathered last-second shutdowns on the launch pad, major engine issues throughout liftoff and later within the hazardous ascent regime, in addition to extreme Thermal Safety System (TPS) harm through the excessive dynamism of atmospheric re-entry. And when a briefcase-sized chunk of insulating foam was noticed on the STS-107 launch video falling from the Exterior Tank (ET) at T+82 seconds and hitting Columbia’s left wing—at exactly the spot the place Strengthened Carbon Carbon (RCC) would later guard the ship in opposition to probably the most extreme re-entry temperatures—concern was elevated, however in the end dismissed.
It was a dismissal as ill-judged as declaring the Titanic to be unsinkable.
The video footage from STS-107’s launch on 16 January provided little indication of what, if any, harm the froth strike had precipitated, save for an enormous bathe of particles. It was unclear if these particles originated from the affect of the froth itself or from shattered items of the RCC panels. If the latter, it didn’t bode effectively for Columbia’s re-entry, for the panels guarded the automobile in opposition to the brunt of three,000-degree-Celsius (5,400-degree-Fahrenheit) extremes through the hypersonic return to Earth.
Senior managers doubted {that a} foam strike—an occasion which had occurred on earlier missions—might conceivably be a “security of flight” challenge. This didn’t, nonetheless, forestall an evaluation of a attainable state of affairs by which the RCC had been breached.
On 31 January, engineer Kevin McCluney provided a hypothetical description to his colleagues on the Johnson Area Heart’s (JSC) flight management group of the form of knowledge “signature” they might anticipate to obtain if the worst ought to occur.
Allow us to suppose, mentioned McCluney—outlined in depth by Michael Cabbage and William Harwood of their harrowing account of the tragedy, Comm Test—that a big gap had been punched via one of many shuttle’s RCC panels, enabling super-heated plasma to enter the airframe.
“Let’s surmise,” he instructed them, “what kind of signature we’d see if a restricted stream of plasma did get into the wheel effectively [of Columbia’s main landing gear], roughly from entry interface till about 200,000 toes (60 kilometers); in different phrases, a ten–15-minute window.” Little might McCluney presumably have guessed that his “signature” would nearly precisely mirror the occasions which befell Columbia on Saturday, 1 February 2003.
“First can be a temperature rise for the tires, brakes, strut actuator and the uplock actuator return…”
At 8:52:17 a.m. EST, 9 minutes after entry interface—the purpose at which the shuttle started to come across the tenuous higher traces of the “wise” ambiance—Entry Flight Director LeRoy Cain and his group noticed the primary uncommon knowledge on their screens. Cain had begun his shift on console earlier that morning, with an up-tempo “Let’s go get ’em, guys,” earlier than giving Husband the go-ahead to carry out the irreversible de-orbit burn to drop Columbia out of orbit and onto an hour-long path to land on the Kennedy Area Heart’s (KSC) Shuttle Touchdown Facility (SLF) at 9:16 a.m. EST.
A lot of the entry profile was managed by the shuttle’s Common Objective Computer systems (GPCs), however with 23 minutes remaining earlier than landing, Upkeep, Mechanical Arm and Crew Techniques (MMACS) Officer Jeff Kling noticed one thing peculiar in his knowledge. It was what flight controllers termed an “off-nominal occasion”.
As later described by Cabbage and Harwood, Kling seen that two downward-pointing arrows appeared subsequent to readings from a pair of sensors deep inside Columbia’s left wing. They have been designed to measure hydraulic fluid temperatures in strains resulting in the elevons. A couple of seconds later, two extra sensors failed. The eye of Kling was captivated; it seemed for all of the world that the wiring to all 4 sensors had been reduce.
Kling and his group tried to fathom a typical “thread” to elucidate the fault. However none was forthcoming.
Kling spoke on to Cain. “FYI, I’ve simply misplaced 4 separate temperature transducers on the left facet of the automobile,” he started, cautiously. “Hydraulic return temperatures. Two of them on System One and one in every of Techniques Two and Three.”
“4 hyd return temps?” queried Cain.
“To the left outboard and left inboard elevon.”
Cain’s ideas mirrored these of Kling: was there a typical root trigger for all 4 sensors to have failed in such shut bodily and temporal proximity to at least one one other? When Kling asserted that there was “no commonality” between the failures, Cain was perplexed, however immediately thought again to the froth strike. In subsequent interviews, he would admit that his fast concern was that scorching fuel had labored its manner via a breach in Columbia’s left wing and was by some means affecting the inside programs.
Nevertheless, Steerage, Navigation and Management Officer (GNC) Mike Sarafin assured him that total automobile efficiency because it crossed the California-Nevada state line at 22.5 instances the pace of sound remained nominal. Was Kling proud of all different hydraulic programs? Kling replied that, sure, the whole lot else was functioning usually.
“Tire pressures would rise, given sufficient time, and assuming the tires don’t get holed,” continued Kevin McCluney’s chilling prediction of what would possibly occur. “The info would begin dropping out as {the electrical} wiring is severed.”
Immediately, at 8:58 a.m. EST, Husband made his first radio transmission since entry interface a quarter-hour earlier. He began to name Houston, however his phrases have been abruptly reduce off. A couple of seconds later got here a lack of temperature and strain knowledge from each the inboard and outboard tires of Columbia’s touchdown gear within the left effectively.
If the tires have been holed or dropping strain, it was very unhealthy information, for STS-107 was a “heavyweight” mission with the absolutely loaded Spacehab science module and experiment pallet. A “wheels-up” stomach touchdown was probably not survivable. The astronauts would wish to carry out a never-before-tried bailout, using an escape pole system carried out after Challenger, however this might not be tried till Columbia was at a lot decrease altitude and at a lot decrease relative airspeed.
“Knowledge loss would come with that for tire pressures and temperatures, brake pressures and temperatures,” concluded McCluney.
After listening to Kling’s report, astronaut Charlie Hobaugh—the lead Capcom on obligation that morning—referred to as Husband to tell him of the anomalous tire strain messages. Hobaugh additionally requested Husband to repeat his final remark.
However there was no reply from Columbia. By now, Cain was urgent Kling for solutions on whether or not the messages have been attributable to defective instrumentation however was suggested that every one related sensors have been studying “off-scale-low”—they’d merely stopped working.
Seconds later, at 8:59:32 a.m., Husband tried once more to contact Mission Management. These have been to be the final phrases ever acquired from Columbia.
“Roger,” he mentioned, presumably acknowledging Hobaugh’s earlier strain name, “uh, buh…” At that time, abruptly, his phrases have been reduce off in mid-sentence, along with the move of knowledge from the orbiter.
Communications have been by no means restored. Thirty-two seconds later, a ground-based observer with a camcorder shot video footage of a number of particles contrails streaking like tears throughout the Texas sky.
With the telemetry damaged, the ambiance in Mission Management was changing into more and more uncomfortable. Kling instructed Cain there was no widespread thread between the tire strain messages and the hydraulic sensor failures; furthermore, different instrumentation for monitoring the positions of the orbiter’s nostril and major touchdown gear had additionally been misplaced.
Because the seconds of radio silence stretched longer, Cain requested Instrumentation and Communications Officer (INCO) Laura Hoppe how lengthy she anticipated the intermittent “comm” to final. She admitted that she anticipated some ratty comm however was shocked and puzzled by how protracted and “stable” it was.
“Columbia, Houston, comm test,” radioed Hobaugh at 9:03 a.m. His phrases have been greeted solely by static and by the echo of his personal voice within the deathly-silent Mission Management. A minute later, he repeated the decision. Once more, there was no reply.
Half a continent away, at KSC, astronauts Jerry Ross and Bob Cabana have been chatting exterior the convoy commander’s van on the SLF, once they heard that communications with Columbia had been misplaced. At first, they have been unconcerned—that’s, till they have been knowledgeable that highly effective long-range radars on the Cape, meant to lock onto the incoming orbiter at 9:04 a.m. and monitor its closing method, noticed nothing coming over the horizon.
In Cain’s phrases, that provided the ultimate punch-in-the-stomach affirmation that every one hope was misplaced. “That was absolutely the black-and-white finish,” he mentioned later. “If the radar is trying and there’s nothing coming over the horizon, the automobile isn’t there.”
In contrast to an plane, which may modify its flight profile to make secondary approaches, the shuttle had just one shot to make a pinpoint touchdown. Its trajectory via the ambiance could possibly be timed to the second and landing was anticipated at 9:16 a.m. Climate knowledge additionally made it attainable to foretell how far down the runway—about 1,500 toes (460 meters)—the shuttle would land.
On the Cape, the assembled crowds noticed the countdown clock tick to zero…after which start ticking upwards once more as 9:16 got here and went. No trademark sonic booms had been heard. No signal of the tiny black-and-white dot of the orbiter had been seen. Veteran shuttle commander Steve Lindsey—later to develop into Chief of the Astronaut Workplace—was one of many escorts for the STS-107 households and his blood ran chilly. One thing was terribly incorrect.
Standing subsequent to NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe that morning was former astronaut Invoice Readdy, now serving because the company’s Affiliate Administrator for Area Flight. O’Keefe would describe the previous fighter pilot and veteran shuttle commander as ashen-faced and visibly trembling. Jerry Ross was a couple of months into his new job as head of the Cape’s Automobile Integration Check Workforce (VITT) and his first act was to say a quick prayer.
In Texas, police have been being inundated with 911 calls, reporting unusual lights within the sky, loud explosions, and cases of falling particles. CNN shortly picked up on the tales and commenced reporting them. In Mission Management, nonetheless, televisions weren’t tuned to exterior broadcasts. It was an off-duty NASA engineer, Michael Garske, who watched the shuttle go overhead from the roadside, south of Houston, and referred to as colleague Don McCormack in Mission Management with the information.
“Don, Don, I noticed it,” Garske cried, paraphrased by Cabbage and Harwood. “It broke up!”
“Decelerate,” McCormack replied. “What are you telling me?”
“I noticed the orbiter. It broke up!”
Sitting behind LeRoy Cain on the identical time, veteran flight director Phil Engelauf acquired a name from off-duty flight director Bryan Austin, who supplied first-hand testimony. By this time, though nobody in Mission Management had bodily seen the proof of the catastrophe, they’d resigned themselves to it.
At 9:05 a.m., Cain requested Flight Dynamics Officer (FDO) Richard Jones when he might anticipate monitoring from the long-range radars in Florida. One minute in the past, got here the reply.
Now, as Engelauf relayed Austin’s emotional report back to Cain, the flight director slowly shook his head, composed himself and turned to the silent management room to declare an emergency. At 9:12 a.m., he instructed Floor Management (GC) Officer Invoice Foster to “lock the doorways”—a de facto admission that every one hope was gone—and ordered flight controllers to not depart the constructing, however to start preserving their knowledge and writing up their logbook notes to be used within the subsequent investigation.
“OK,” Cain started, “all flight controllers on the Flight loop, we have to kick off the FCOH [Flight Control Operations Handbook] contingency plan process, FCOH guidelines, web page 2.8-5.” He then proceeded to speak them via the required actions: preserving logbook entries and show printouts, speaking solely on the Flight loop and limiting exterior phone calls and transmissions. “No telephone calls, no knowledge, in or out,” he instructed them.
9 hundred miles (1,500 kilometers) to the east, in Florida, the STS-107 households have been shepherded from the touchdown website to the crew quarters by 9:30 a.m. It was left to Bob Cabana to interrupt the horrible information—one in all his worst jobs in his astronaut profession.
Mission Management, he defined, had not picked up any radio beacon indicators which might have been activated if the crew had managed to bail out of Columbia. Regardless, the orbiter was at an altitude of round 40 miles (64 kilometers) and touring at almost 15,000 miles per hour (24,000 kilometers per hour) when it disintegrated. That alone provided not even the faintest hope of being survivable.
Later that morning, close to Hemphill, Texas, Roger Coday discovered some human stays. He mentioned a quick prayer and constructed a tiny picket cross by the roadside.
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